SCOTUS v. Immigration: "How Rulings Impact the States and Cities"

Since the 19th Century, the Supreme Court of the United States has played a fundamental role in shaping immigration policy in the United States of America. However, in the modern political ecosystem of our country, the question of which branch of government holds the authority to regulate immigration has become a central argument of political and legal contention since President Biden took office in 2021. While the Constitution of the United States grants the federal government the supreme authority over immigration matters under Article One Section Eight Clause Three, city and state governments have often sought out ways to address the concerns of immigration at the local level, especially when the local needs, or the perceived needs, are not met at the federal level. Highlighting the tense power struggles exemplified through legislative action is Texas Governor Greg Abbott's 2021 Operation Lone Stars. Though the state government perceives that the federal government, especially the executive branch, is ignoring the issues mounting at the southern border, Governor Abbott argues that "Texas is not trying to impose its own law" but "…simply trying to enforce the law…" (McCandless Farmer). This tension between federal primacy and local autonomy has led the Supreme Court to explicitly delineate the extent of local and state powers on immigration policy. Through landmark cases such as De Canas v. Bica (1976) and Arizona v. United States (2012), the Court has shaped not just the scope of federal authority on immigration but the rights of states and cities to create legislation or policies on immigration enforcement, employment, and sanctuary practices. With a strained dynamic in the current political landscape, a critical question arises: how have the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on immigration over time shaped the authority of local governments, and what impact have they had on the creation and enforcement of local immigration policy? Through a careful analytical exploration of empirical and testimonial evidence, our research argues that the Supreme Court, through precedent-setting decisions over the past one hundred and thirty-five years, has incessantly upheld federal primacy concerning immigration policy or legislation while granting local levels of government specific powers in enforcement and localized policy-making. Thus, creating a multifaceted and, at times, tense system of governance. Through landmark cases, the Supreme Court has established that the primary immigration authority is granted to the federal government while carving out limited rights to the state and city. The Court's majority opinions have cemented the path for state-level legislation or city policies, especially in areas such as employment regulation and sanctuary city practices, producing a multifaceted dynamic between local autonomy and federal primacy in immigration enforcement.  

The Supreme Court has played a fundamental role in shaping the balance of power between the federal and local governments, specifically in the context of immigration legislation and policy. The Court has defined the boundaries of state and city involvement in immigration legislation and policy through several landmark decisions. Early in the Court's history, Chae Chan Ping v. United States (1889) and Fong Yue Ting v. United States (1893) established precedents that granted the federal government the primary authority over immigration matters and limited state-level intervention. De Canas v. Bica (1976) allowed limited regulations at the state level concerning the employment of immigrants. Influencing local policy, the Court determined in Plyler v. Doe (1982) that the states could not deny access to public education based on the grounds of immigration status. In Arizona v. United States (2012), federal primacy authority was reinforced by striking down parts of Arizona's immigration law while allowing the states some discretion regarding enforcement practices. Finally, Printz v. United States (1997) set a foundational precedent that limited the federal government's mandate on local enforcement of federal regulatory programs. Though the basis of this case did not pertain to immigration policy, it has since shaped and applied to support sanctuary city policies across the United States of America. Together, these six cases and their subsequent opinions by the Court illustrate the complex and ever-evolving role of the Supreme Court in shaping state and local responses to immigration within the confines of the primary authority of the federal government.

To fully grasp the nuanced issues at hand in the power dynamic between the federal and local governments that have repeatedly come to heed, we must first understand the historical context of federal primacy and the early cases that influenced generations to follow. From the very formation of our democratic republic and the cautious balance of federalism, “…a system of government in which the same territory is controlled by two levels of government”, the Framers of the Constitution explicitly outlined that federal law was to supersede state law to prevent local governments from interfering in federal powers and taking over responsibilities or functions to be handled by the federal government (Federalism). Article Six, Clause Two of the Constitution of the United States outlines, "this Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding" (The Constitution of the United States: A Transcription). Additionally, through interpretation, Article One, Section Eight, Clause Three has granted the United States Congress full authority over interstate commerce, further expanding federalism by setting a precedent following the decision of the Court in Gibbons v. Ogden (1824).   

Not long after Gibbons (1824), the Supreme Court would hear its first two cases directly impacting the intersectionality of immigration and federalism. In 1889, the Court heard Chae Chan Ping v. United States (1889), which argued that Chae Chan Ping's rights as a documented immigrant had been violated by the passage of Congress' Scott Act of 1888. The act was an addendum to the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, a crucial first piece of legislation that restricted immigration into the United States of America. It prohibited the reentry of immigrant Chinese laborers into the United States of America should they leave the country for any reason. The Court's decision affirmed the federal government's plenary powers, "…the complete or absolute authority granted to a governing body over a specific area without limitations…," to regulate immigration matters even when changes to the legislation or policy may reverse earlier actions by the legislative branch (Plenary Power).

In 1892, the Geary Act was passed by Congress, which reauthorized the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and mandated that Chinese immigrants obtain a certificate of residency or "…shall be deemed and adjudged to be unlawfully within the United States, and may be arrested…" (The University of Texas at Austin Department of History). Fong Yue Ting and two other immigrant Chinese laborers challenged the legislation following their arrest. They had not obtained the correct documentation and were set to be deported back to China, arguing it was a violation of their rights under the Constitution. In a six to three opinion, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Congress's actions that "…without regard to their color, to testify in the courts of the United States, rests on acts of Congress, which Congress may at its discretion modify or repeal" (Fong Yue Ting v. United States 729). Fong Yue Ting v. United States (1893) solidified the federal government's powers to create requirements for immigrant residents that, if not followed, could lead to detention or deportation from the country.

From these two foundational cases of immigration legislation set forth by the Supreme Court, they underlined that the governing significance of immigration was not just foreign policy but a matter of national sovereignty. This federal exclusivity emphasized the state or local government's lack of influence and power on immigration legislation or policy. From this emerged the preemption doctrine in constitutional law, or "…the idea that a higher authority of law will displace the law of a lower authority of law when the two authorities come into conflict" (Preemption). At the core of Chae Chan Ping (1889) and Fong Yue Ting (1893), the implications limited city and state governments from creating laws that contradicted or interfered with federal immigration legislation or policy, rendering their role moot. 

Since the solidification of federal authority on immigration legislation and policy that emerged in the late 19th Century, the Supreme Court has heard three critical cases that have systematically impacted state and local governments. In 1976, the Court set a new precedent allowing state involvement in immigrant policies with their unanimous decision in De Canas v. Bica (1976). Originating in California, a group of farm laborers, Bica et al., challenged Labor Code § 2805(a) as unconstitutional, as it prohibited employers from knowingly hiring "…an alien who is not entitled to lawful residence in the United States if such employment would have an adverse effect on lawful resident workers…" (De Canas v. Bica 351). While the laborers argued that only Congress could legislate the issue of immigration and, subsequently, immigrants, California defended its labor code, intending to protect the job market for American citizens or those with legal residency status.

In a unanimous decision, the Court ruled in favor of the State of California, outlining three main justifications for their ruling. First, Justice William Brennan confirmed that not all immigration policies need to be passed by the United States Congress when the implications are on local matters, such as the job market. Furthering the state's power, he acknowledges that states have a stake in the legislative process in areas that indirectly influence immigration while recognizing that the federal government has primary control. He argues, "…due regard for the presuppositions of our embracing federal system, including the principle of diffusion of power not as a matter of doctrinaire localism but as a promoter of democracy, has required us not to find withdrawal from the States of power to regulate where the activity regulated was a merely peripheral concern of the [federal regulation] …" (De Canas v. Bica 360-261). Lastly, the Court held that the California Labor Code was meant to regulate employment concerns directly, not immigration status, and thus, the state's actions did not infringe on federal primacy. In this instance, in a gentle yet powerful way, the Court stripped the federal government of some of its power to effectively legislate immigration matters by providing the state level the ability to apply some direct controls.

Compared to the legislative implication of De Canas v. Bica (1976) on the labor market in California and nationwide, policies at the municipal level were shaped by Plyler v. Doe (1982). In 1975, the State of Texas revised Texas Education Code 21.031 to withhold state funding from any school district that enrolled undocumented children. On behalf of a group of undocumented immigrant children and their families, a class action lawsuit was filed, collectively referred to as Doe, claiming the legislation violated their Constitutional rights as inhabitants of the country. The State of Texas, in contrast, argued that denying undocumented immigrants’ enrollment into state-funded schools would save them money and discourage migration to the state. However, in a five to four decision, the Court affirmed that undocumented students were guaranteed access to free public education, like all American citizens, under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, regardless of immigration status. It was ultimately ruled that the Texas statute on which this case was brought was unconstitutional.

However, in addition to the ruling, in the opinion of the Court, Justice William Brennan made it abundantly clear what freedoms were granted to undocumented immigrants within the United States. In an unwavering proclamation, they assert, "whatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is surely a "person" in any ordinary sense of that term. Aliens, even aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long been recognized as "persons" guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments" (Plyler v. Doe 210). Through the proclamation of guaranteed protections, this case emphasized that every undocumented immigrant is granted the same fundamental rights as American citizens, as outlined in the Constitution of the United States. Furthermore, both the opinion and dissent in Plyler (1982) usurp the balance of power in favor of the federal government through their insistence that it is “…senseless for an enlightened society to deprive any children-including illegal aliens-of an elementary education,” outlined Chief Justice Warren Burger (Plyler v. Doe 242). By asserting that all persons are covered under the Constitution and underlining that all children are guaranteed an education, the Court provides no state or local governments leeway to discriminate based on immigration status.

Most recently, in 2012, the Supreme Court reiterated the assertion of federal primacy on immigration legislation and policy in the United States of America. In Arizona v. United States (2012), the federal government challenged Arizona's 2010 Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, SB1070, which the legislative body passed in an effort to provide greater authority to local and state law enforcement to enforce immigration law in the state. The challenge highlighted four key provisions that the United States government argued were overridden, or pre-empted, by standing federal immigration legislation. In SB1070, Section 3 and Section 5(C) sought to create state misdemeanors for undocumented immigrants who fail to carry federal alien registration documentation and for seeking or working within the state of Arizona. The provisions Section 6 and Section 2(B) authorized law enforcement to arrest immigrants without a warrant under the assumptions of probable cause, while the latter, known as the "Show Me Your Papers" provision, required officers to check the immigration status of anyone stopped, detained, or arrested whom they believed the be unlawfully in the United States of America.

In a five to three decision, the Supreme Court found three of Arizona's contested provisions to be unconstitutional, Section 3, 5(C), and 6, as they directly conflicted with federal law. Justice Anthony Kennedy reiterates the principle of federal primacy in the opinion of the Court that "federalism, central to the constitutional design, adopts the principle that both the National and State Governments have elements of sovereignty the other is bound to respect" (Arizona v. United States 398). However, the Court upheld Section 2(B) as "at this stage, without the benefit of a definitive interpretation from the state courts, it would be inappropriate to assume § 2(B) will be construed in a way that creates a conflict with federal law" (Arizona v. United States 415), thus leaving the provision open for future challenges should it be implemented in a way that would indicate racial profiling or other unconstitutional practices.

Together, these three cases on immigration legislation and policy by the Supreme Court have carved out the narrow confides, creating a framework from within which the state and local governments may legislate or govern on this issue. However, they uniquely highlight specific instances or areas where local governments may influence policy, specifically labor or immigration enforcement. De Canas v. Bica (1976) marked a grave departure from the norm of federal primacy to allow the State of California to set restrictions for the employment of undocumented immigrants, which created a path forward for states nationwide to address immigration in a minimal context. In contrast, Plyler v. Doe (1982) reinforced the State of Texas’ limited autonomy on immigration-related legislation and policies, underlining that undocumented immigrants are provided the same rights as American citizens under the Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment. Arizona v. United States (2012) reasserted the federal government's authority while supporting local governments through cooperation within specific conditions on law enforcement.

However, before the Supreme Court delivered the Arizona v. United States (2012) decision, many states began to set boundaries for themselves and test the limitations of their powers through state legislative processes to push back on immigrant populations. In 2011, a year after Arizona's SB1070 went into law, Georgia and Alabama followed suit with state-level immigration legislation that, like Arizona, included provisions to empower law enforcement to check immigration status on stops and create state-level penalties for other actions by an immigrant. With Georgia's HB 87, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011, and Alabama's HB 56, the Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, each state sought to flex its legislative power and address undocumented immigration within their state head-on. However, both states failed to deliver a sound constitutional solution for the most part and, in turn, unequivocally exposed the limits of the state-level power by providing a haphazard, unsuccessful legislative policy targeting their issues.

In August 2012, just two months after the decision in Arizona v. United States (2012), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit blocked key provisions of Alabama and Georgia's anti-immigration legislation. For the State of Georgia, like the Supreme Court in Arizona (2012), the Eleventh Circuit upheld the Section 8 provision that allowed law enforcement agents to check the immigration status of those stopped. Section 7, which created state criminal violation for transporting or moving, concealing or harboring, or inducing undocumented immigrants to enter Georgia, was found to be unconstitutional. Judge Charles Wilson lamented, "The end result of section 7 is to layer additional penalties atop federal law in direct opposition to the Court's direction in Crosby [v. National Foreign Trade Council (2000)]" (Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal 28).

As one of the harshest legislative packages on immigration in the United States of America, Alabama's HB 56 also received a mixed response from the Eleventh Circuit upon their decision, sticking down many provisions and upholding a similar law enforcement provision comparable to Arizona or Georgia's HB 87, Section 8. According to the American Civil Liberties Union, the Court "…invalidated those provisions of Alabama's law that required schools to verify the immigration status of incoming students [Section 28]; that criminalized failure to carry immigration documents [Section 10]; and that invalidated contracts with undocumented immigrants [Section 30]; and that made it a crime to transport undocumented immigrants [Section 13]" (Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama v. Bentley).

While the cases in Alabama, Arizona, and Georgia are comparative in the scope of the legislation passed and subsequently challenged, they tested the boundaries of state-level involvement through actions that have interpreted the law in ways that do not achieve their intended purpose nor fall into the confines of power held by the state. Judge Wilson masterfully elaborates on this very issue in the Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal (2012) opinion, "However, when state laws intrude into areas of overwhelming federal interest and erode the discretion implicit in the sovereignty of the country, we must recognize the supremacy of federal law" (Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights et al. v. Deal 33). While some states, like Arizona, Georgia, and Alabama, have chosen to pass anti-immigration and anti-immigrant legislation, others, like California, have safeguarded immigrant populations by creating a Sanctuary State.

As jurisdictions try to safeguard immigrant populations, sanctuary policies and the reasons for adoption differ from one to the next, as no universal definition applies to each. However, each level of government will determine what is best for them and their constituents. Some jurisdictions may want to adopt sanctuary policies to “…strengthen relations between local law enforcement and…immigrants…” by limiting reporting with federal authorities, “determine how they will prioritize and allocate their resources,” or even shield “…local law enforcement agencies from liabilities…” associated with federal immigration enforcement (Sanctuary Policies: An Overview). Ultimately, these policies are implemented to promote human rights, empower growth within communities, and maintain a separation of power between the federal and local governments.

In a stark juxtaposition to the three states highlighted previously, California hoped to brand itself as an immigrant-friendly state. On October 5, 2017, California's SB 54, or the California Values Act, was signed into law. The ACLU of California describes the bill as a new law that "…protects the safety and well-being of all Californians, specifically immigrant communities, by ensuring that police, schools, health facilities, and courts remain accessible to Californians from all walks of life" and is set to "…limit the entanglement of local law enforcement's limited resources from federal immigration enforcement" (ACLU of California). However, it was not long before the United States, under the direction of then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions, would challenge SB 54 and two other bills that California signed into law in 2017. Joining SB54 was AB 450, which required employers to alert all employees before an inspection from federal immigration officers, and AB 103, which set inspection requirements for immigrant detention centers.

In United States v. California (2019), the federal government challenged all three bills under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution of the United States, which outlined that “this Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof…shall be the supreme Law of the Land…” (The Constitution of the United States: A Transcription). The Ninth Circuit upheld all three bills as constitutional while sticking down a provision of AB 450 that fined employers who gave federal immigration officials access to nonpublic areas of the building. While the opinion from Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr. highlights federal primacy under Arizona (2012), he sites Printz v. United States (1997) as justification for California's state powers, "under the Tenth Amendment and other provisions of the Constitution, 'the Federal Government may not compel the States to implement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory programs'" (United States, Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 41-42). Through the Ninth Circuit's ruling and the Supreme Court's subsequent denial certiorari, United States v. California (2019) reaffirms the state-level powers granted to local governments in shaping immigration legislation. Additionally, it reinforced the legality of sanctuary state policies and provided a constitutional framework for other jurisdictions to adopt to resist immigration enforcement by federal agencies. 

However, while these cases are critical to understanding the dynamic in relation to federalism and the Constitution of the United States, each of these pieces of legislation has inherently become prominent fixtures in the immigration dialogue as attitudes towards immigrants or immigration at large have continually evolved. The Pew Research Center, a nonpartisan fact tank, has found that since 2016, views on immigration have shifted with “about half of Americans now view illegal immigration as a very big problem in the country,” while also outlining a common ground on the importance of providing extensive resources to our immigration system (Dunn). Though in the era of President Donald Trump, one may want to attribute shifts in public opinion to him leading up to his election in 2016, Mustafa Sagir and Stephen Mockabee, authors of “Public Attitudes Toward Immigration: Was There a Trump Effect?”, have found no correlation between Trump and public opinion. Through an analysis of campaign speeches, public attitudes of the time, and media coverage of the 2016 election cycle, they deduce that “…Trump’s 2016 candidacy did not persuade so much as it activated” and he “…did not significantly alter American public opinion on immigration (Sagir and Mockabee). However, furthering the argument and shift in public opinion, according to Gallup polling since 2019, there has been a steady decline in those who see immigration as a good thing and an increase in those who believe the number of immigrants within our country should decrease, further conflating the issues of immigration legislation between the federal and local governments (Gallup).

The Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. United States (2012) unequivocally shaped state-level immigration legislation and policies by delineating the confines within which states must operate without encroaching on federal primacy. Leading up to the decision, conservative states like Alabama, Georgia, and Arizona enacted stricter immigration legislation, often mirroring or exceeding Arizona's controversial SB 1070 in the hopes of limiting immigration to their state. These laws aimed to enhance state-level immigration enforcement but faced significant backlash, including legal challenges over the constitutionality and allegations of racial profiling. Comparatively, pro-immigrant states like California used Arizona (2012) to justify their sanctuary state policies that limit cooperation with federal immigration enforcement. By emphasizing the anti-commandeering doctrine of the Tenth Amendment, which outlines that powers not afforded to the federal government in the Constitution are reserved for the state, California asserted its right to allocate resources and manage local and state law enforcement independently of the federal government's priorities (The Constitution of the United States: A Transcription). This duality highlights the complex intersectionality between federal and state legislative powers, as Arizona amplified tensions between states with opposing approaches to immigration enforcement. These competing legislative strategies or priorities underline the broader debate surrounding federalism, demonstrating how Supreme Court precedent continues to influence the balance of power in addressing immigration at every level of government.

While “…some localities work closely with federal immigration officials to facilitate federal regulatory schemes, other localities adopt policies that prohibit cooperation with federal immigration law, becoming ‘sanctuary cities’ for undocumented immigrants” (Michalove 237). Emerging in the mid-1980s under the Reagan Administration, the sanctuary movement sought to challenge the societal norms of the United States of America and influence policy changes. It started as a movement led by “…Jim Corbett, a Quaker, and John Fife, a Presbyterian minister...” who were “…illegally escorting undocumented Salvadoran refugees into the United States from Mexico and providing shelter for them in churches and houses,” quickly growing to “…45 Sanctuary churches” across the country in 1983 (Chinchilla et al. 105-106). In the forty-two years since the birth of the sanctuary movement, it has expanded across the contiguous United States. According to the Center for Immigration Studies, a nonpartisan independent think tank, currently, there are thirteen sanctuary states, forty-eight sanctuary cities, and one hundred seventy-six sanctuary counties across twenty-two states and the District of Columbia. The organization defines these jurisdictions as having “…laws, ordinances, policies, or practices that prevent state and/or law enforcement agencies from cooperating fully with ICE in gaining custody of criminal aliens who have been arrested for local crimes” (Vaughan and Griffith).

Following the decision in Printz v. United States (1997), many state and city governments have used the anti-commandeering doctrine to create constitutionally sound sanctuary city practices. While the case did not center around immigration or immigrant legislation, it did, however, center on the federalist principle of state sovereignty. In the opinion of the Court, Justice Antonin Scalia argues that “not only do the enactments of the early Congresses, as far as we are aware, contain no evidence of an assumption that the Federal Government may command the States' executive power in the absence of a particularized constitutional authorization, they contain some indication of precisely the opposite assumption” (Printz v. United States 909). However, the Court looked for further indications on the dynamic between the federal and state to outline their argument cohesively. “The Framers' experience under the Articles of Confederation had persuaded them that using the States as the instruments of federal governance was both ineffectual and provocative of federal-state conflict (Printz v. United States 919). Looking to the issues plaguing the original thirteen colonies that led to the Constitution of the United States, they point to The Federalist No. 15 and the dissent from New York v. United States (1992) to prove that it is Congress to regulate the individual, not the state.     

Providing an analysis of Printz and the implication on sanctuary cities, Hannah Michalove, in “Expanding Printz in the Sanctuary City Debate,” highlights New York City and its fight against Federal Statute Section 1373, titled the Communication Between Government Agencies and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. She argues that the Second District Court’s interpretation of § 1373 and New York City’s policies “…resulted in an incomplete analysis that misconstrues the federalist balance of the tenth Amendment and the Supremacy Clause” while a narrow-minded, limited interpretation has left this issue up to further challenges or controversy. City of New York v. United States (1999) is one example of sanctuary cities fighting for sovereignty. In 2019, under then-President Trump, the United States challenged California over three laws designed to protect state residents from federal immigration enforcement officers. However, unlike in the City of New York (1999), the Ninth Circuit Court affirmed the state's right to legislate under Printz. It upheld all three as constitutional while marking one subsection of AB 103 unconstitutional and highlighting the self-governance they had been advocating for.

Through the application and interpretation of Printz (1997), cities and states have continually sought autonomy over their jurisdiction, aligning with the Constitution of the United States. By enacting legislation to safeguard immigrants, these localities are actively governing within the confines of power bestowed upon them by the Supreme Court. By limiting cooperation with federal immigration officers and providing essential resources, like the right to housing in New York City, local governments protect immigrants living within and challenge the federal government's overreaching control. With the reinforcement of the anti-commandeering doctrine and interpretation of federalism, sanctuary policies illustrate the multifaceted, delicate balance of power between federal primacy and state sovereignty, highlighting ongoing tensions characteristic of American federalism. However, we would be remiss if we did not highlight that this complex tension is not explicitly linked to immigration. Throughout United States history, this dynamic has repetitively reared its head, most notably in the years leading up to the Civil War, the Civil Rights Movement, and, to a degree, the Gay Liberation Movement.

While the Supreme Court has continually delineated immigration legislation and policy between the federal and local governments, under the first Trump Administration, the federal government actively sought to create limitations on state and city-level immigration policy. In a backdoor effort by Attorney General Jeff Sessions and the Department of Justice, they adjusted the conditions of the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) and the COPS Hiring Program (CHP) for the fiscal year 2017. These federal grants provided state and local governments with funding for various programs, including crime prevention, law enforcement, mental health programs, and much more. However, for these municipalities to be granted funding, they must “complete a certification of compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373 [the Communication Between Government Agencies and the Immigration and Naturalization Service statute],” “allow ICE access to jails and detention facilities,” and “provide ICE with a 48-hour notice before a detainee is released” (DOJ Grants and Sanctuary Cities 1).

Following the changes the Department of Justice implemented, many jurisdictions nationwide challenged the legality of these three new conditions. Altogether, according to the Immigrant Legal Resource Center, a nonprofit organization focused on legal education and immigration policy advocacy, seven individual challenges made their way through the judicial system, including City of Philadelphia v. Sessions (2018), City of Chicago v. Session (2018), City of Los Angeles v. Sessions (2018), and State ex rel. Becerra v. Sessions (2018). Collectively, these cases sought to declare the actions of the Department of Justice unconstitutional for violating the Separation of Powers Clause and the Spending Clause of the Constitution of the United States as well as the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (DOJ Grants and Sanctuary Cities 1-2). Ultimately, the First, Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit Courts found the immigration-related conditions unlawful. The following year, in fiscal year 2018, the Department of Justice published a new state solicitation for the JAG program, learning from their legal challenges. However, once again, in 2020, the Circuit Courts “…concluded that DOJ lacked statutory authority to impose the new conditions” and were ultimately rolled back under President Biden’s Administration (Immigration Policy Tracking Project).

At the core of these cases was a power struggle. While the Department of Justice and Attorney General’s Jeff Session and Bill Barr, who followed, sought to assert their authority over city or state-level sanctuary policies by setting limitations on federal funding, those affected argued that the federal government’s actions were unconstitutional overreach. However, these actions have little to no impact on sanctuary cities or states. In fact, localities that are sanctuaries statistically perform better than those of non-sanctuaries. The Center for American Progress, a nonpartisan policy institute, outlines that, on average, there are 35.5 fewer crimes, a higher median annual income of $4,353 per household, a 2.3 percent lower poverty rate, and a 1.1 percent lower unemployment rate (Wong). They further summarize that the data suggest that “…when local law enforcement focuses on keeping communities safe, rather than becoming entangled in federal immigration enforcement efforts, communities are safer and community members stay more engaged in the local economy,” thus in return, distributing the “…benefits to individual households, communities, counties, and the economy as a whole” (Wong). Altogether, the research outlined by Wong highlights that by city and state governments fighting to protect all people within their jurisdiction, whether American citizens or not, there are significant gains for all. Providing a juxtaposition to the impact sanctuary legislation may have on its jurisdiction, anti-immigration policy has shown to have negative implications. For example, following Florida Governor Ron DeSantis’ signing of Senate Bill 1718, an immigration law targeting undocumented immigrants, into law in 2023, it is estimated to have cost “…the state economy $12.6 billion in its first year,” proving that there to be significant ramifications on both sides of the immigration policy spectrum (NPR).

In a country founded on federalism with state sovereignty enshrined in the Constitution of the United States in the Tenth Amendment, this cyclical back-and-forth power dynamic outlined throughout our argument surrounding immigration legislation is to be expected. However, the Supreme Court's involvement and subsequent opinions on immigration cases have had sweeping implications on the balance between federal, state, and local ability to legislate effectively. Their critical role in delineating powers in disputes shapes the multifaceted dynamic at play that extends past immigration policy to that of questions of federalism and governance at its core. The Supreme Court has continually reinforced the idea of federal primacy in immigration policy, as highlighted in Arizona (2012). However, these rulings outline a nuanced approach to state or local involvement. While a city or state may not legislate a policy that contradicts federal legislation, it is given discretion in implementing it, as seen in the aftermath of Printz (1997), which, as we have outlined, leads to economic growth and lower crime rates. This tense dynamic has continually fueled tension between the levels of government within the United States of America. For example, while sanctuary city policies represent a challenge to the federal government's priorities depending on who controls the executive office, the Court has underscored the limits of federal power when tied to funding. The broader implication of these decisions highlights the ever-evolving intergovernmental relationship at play. The balance the Supreme Court has tread over time has reaffirmed federal primacy while respecting local governments at times. 

As we navigate the incoming return to a Trump Administration, the landscape of immigration and immigrant legislation, policy, and subsequent politics is set to be one that will exacerbate the current challenging dynamic between the federal and local governments. While we know the promises made on the campaign trail leading up to the 2024 election, such as mass deportation, the trajectory of the next four years is unknown, including the grave economic implications these drastic immigration policies may carry. However, his previous tenure as President of the United States provides a jumping-off point. For example, as previously outlined, the Department of Justice’s aggressive challenges to sanctuary policies will no doubt become a fixture again. Additionally, during his first administration, Trump was no stranger to executive orders to limit the influx of immigrants into the country. We may see the 2017 Muslim ban and the 2019 “Remain in Mexico” program reinstituted on day one and possibly escalate, leading to intensified legal conflicts. 

As immigration is a profoundly divisive issue, as underlined in the 2024 election, the complex dynamic between the federal and local governments will grow increasingly strained under the second Trump Administration, as democratic governors have signaled “…their willingness to defy the new Trump administration, vowing to protect freedoms in their states and to wage legal and political battle if the president-elect follows through with controversial proposals” (Mueller). With the threat of centralizing immigration enforcement under the new Trump Administration, the Supreme Court will play an essential role in adjudicating significant challenges, providing a robust framework of possibilities for many decades to come. However, it is hard to determine how the current Court, with a conservative majority, may rule on these hypothetical cases as there have been multiple accounts where they have broken from then-President Trump or his administration.

Since the Court’s early history, the Supreme Court has shaped precedent by explicitly delineating the federal government as the primary authority over immigration matters and limited state-level intervention through cases like Chae Chan Ping v. United States (1889), Fong Yue Ting v. United States (1893) and Arizona v. United States (2012). Alternatively, the Court has carved out narrow authority for state and local legislation with decisions in De Canas v. Bica (1976), Plyler v. Doe (1982), and Printz v. United States (1997). Together, these six cases illustrate the intersectionality of federal and local government's response to immigration and the ever-evolving role of the Supreme Court to uphold stare decisis or navigate uncharted territory with new, evolving precedents. 

As outlined, immigration policy and politics since the 19th Century have continually evolved and have increasingly become a cornerstone of the modern political ecosystem. While the Constitution of the United States grants the federal government supreme authority over immigration matters under Article One Section Eight Clause Three, state and local governments have often sought out ways to legislate concerns about immigration at the local level. With President-Elect Trump returning to the White House in January 2025, tension at the local level has begun to emerge as Democratic governments begin to protect against the implications his administration will have on immigration legislation and immigrant policy. Through an analysis of empirical and testimonial evidence, our research answers the critical question of how the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on immigration over time have shaped the authority of local governments and what impact they have had on the creation and enforcement of local immigration policy. By the actions of the Court, through its decisions over the past one hundred and thirty-five years, the Supreme Court of the United States has defined its role in unequivocally outlining the boundaries of immigration policy or legislation at the state and local levels, establishing that the primary immigration authority is granted to the federal government while carving out limited rights to the state and city. As we enter a new era of immigration policy and politics in United States history, the complex balance of federal primacy and local sovereignty will continually evolve and uphold the bedrock principle of American federalism, defining not just the legislation itself but our collective national identity.

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